Abstract. A removable visible watermarking scheme, which operates in the discrete cosine transform (DCT) domain
Introduction
The use of visible watermarks is to identify the ownership of works and to prevent the viewers from making unauthorized use beyond their limited copying rights. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] Visible watermarking is the easiest ways to identify the originator of the digital content since no special tools are required to extract the ownership information from the watermarked content. Generally speaking, visible watermarking techniques can be divided into two types: irremovable and removable. The former mainly considers the following two factors. One is that the watermark must be adaptive to the host image or video. That is to say, the watermark should be visible in the watermarked digital content, but must not affect the visual quality of the original art. The other is that the embedded watermark should be strongly resistant to unintended editing and malicious attacks. 10, 11 By contrast, removable visible watermarking techniques provide another efficient solution to copyright protection problems. The original digital content is marked with an erasable pattern, such as a copyright notification, before distribution or release on the Internet for free viewing. As described in Refs. 7-9, only removable visible watermarking techniques are suitable for some applications, such as the following two:
1. Digital images and videos play an important role in people's life and are gradually taking the places of their classical analog counterparts. Content providers can distribute or share them via computer networks for free preview and download after embedding the removable visible copyright information. Anyone who has interest in their content can gain higher ͑bet-ter͒ definition versions by purchasing the secret key from the producers for removing the copyright information. 2. In a commercial environment, a company can gain profits by releasing free-trial software to users for a limited period of time, but it would stop running once the trial period ends. For this purpose, a removable visible watermark can be embedded into the software-dependent digital content ͑e.g., engineering drawing͒ to affect its normal use. In order to continue working, the user needs to activate the software and remove the watermark from the digital content with the license key.
Although there are many potential applications requiring the removable visible watermarking, most papers available in the literature focus on the development of irremovable techniques. Many reversible ͑also called invertible or distortion-free͒ methods ͑e.g., Refs. 12-14͒ have been in-troduced for invisible watermarking, but they can hardly be extended to removable visible watermarking since the two types of watermarking algorithms are designed to meet different requirements of robustness for different application scenarios. 7 Thus far, as far as the authors' knowledge goes, only a few visible watermarking schemes [7] [8] [9] are removable. Mohanty et al. 4 proposed a discrete cosine transform ͑DCT͒ domain adaptive watermarking algorithm. The adaptive factors are computed via a mathematical model developed by exploiting the human visual system ͑HVS͒ properties. But the texture features of the original watermark are not considered while calculating these factors and the embedded watermark is legally irremovable. Generally, removable visible watermarking may be further classified into the following two categories: lossy 7 and lossless. 8, 9 For lossy schemes, the irreversibility is mainly due to the inherent problems such as modulation, overflows, underflows, and rounding error occurring during embedding and removing process. Hu et al. 7 introduced a strategy for constructing a removable visible watermarking system and implemented it in wavelet domain. The DWT coefficients of the watermark used for embedding are selected by a keycontrolled template. However, in some circumstances, this approach fails to authenticate the property of the digital content and attackers may remove the marked copyright information without the secret key with a good chance of success. For lossless schemes, the lossless recovery of the original signal is achieved by an employing compression technique 8 or reversible embedding function. 9 However, despite their merit of lossless image recovery, the two schemes 8, 9 can only work in the spatial domain, making it unsuitable for most Internet applications, where media transactions are carried out in compressed formats, such as JPEG and JPEG using DCT and DWT.
Aiming at maintaining applicability, a DCT-based removable visible watermarking algorithm for images is proposed in this work. We embed a variant of the original copyright pattern as the visible watermark into the host image. The generation of such a watermark is key controlled; thus, without the secret key the same variant of the original watermark cannot be derived from the marked image. Hence, an adversary has no idea which watermark version has been embedded into the original host image so that the visual quality of the resulting image obtained by the unauthorized users without the correct key may be very poor. In addition, we also expect the visual quality of the resulting image attained by an authorized user after removing the embedded visible watermark to be as high as possible. As will be seen later, this objective is arrived at by estimating the original adaptive factors. Generally, the more accurate the estimated factors are, the better the visual quality of the recovered image is. In order to approximately predict the original adaptive factors, some essential data are pseudorandomly hidden in the high-frequency subbands of the marked image during the embedding process. Hence, the peak signal-to-noise ratio ͑PSNR͒ values of the legally recovered images are highly increased.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we present an approach to preprocess the watermark in order to get a variant for embedding and to compute the adaptive scaling and embedding factors in detail. Sec. 3 describes the strategies to embed and remove the watermark. Some experimental results for evaluating the performance of the proposed algorithm are given in Sec. 4. Section 5 draws the conclusions.
Watermark Preprocessing Procedure
The watermark preprocessing procedure consists of two subprocedures: ͑i͒ the design of the watermark preprocessing module and ͑ii͒ the determination of the scaling factor for the host image and the embedding factor for the preprocessed watermark. Watermark preprocessing is necessary because key-dependent preprocessing of the original watermark image I w for constructing a variant of the original watermark is to ensure the infeasibility of removing the embedded visible watermark by using the incorrect keys ͑i.e., illegal removal͒, and the scaling and embedding factors are to insure the conformity with HVS model. In the proposed algorithm, Eq. ͑1͒ is employed to embed the visible watermark, w ͒ to represent the same image in both spatial and DCT transform domains.
Design of the Watermark Preprocessing Module
The preprocessed visible watermark image I pw needs to meet two fundamental requirements: Obviously, there exist various functions f that meet the two requirements. We propose a preprocessing function as shown in Fig. 1 pw . Thus, the value of pЈ should deviate much from 0.
Step 2.3: Obtain key-based matrix I m pw by performing element-by-element multiplication on m'th original watermark image block I m w and randomly chosen matrix D m .
Step 3: Perform inverse DCT on all key-controlled I m pw 's to produce preprocessed visible watermark image I pw . The chaotic sequence is random and highly sensitive to initial conditions, in this work the secret key; thus, the random matrix D m 's generated by the chaotic logistic map with different initial values helps to produce different preprocessed watermark image versions I pw 's, which satisfies the first requirement mentioned above. On the other hand, in order to meet the second requirement, the minimal element value of pЈ for constituting the random matrix D m in Step 2.2 is controlled to prevent the preprocessed watermark image I pw from deviating too much from the pattern of the original image I w . Hence, it is believed that the chaotic logistic map is an effective approach to preprocessing the original image I w . Note that it is also worth mentioning that the chaotic logistic map is just one possible scheme for preprocessing the original watermark. Other suitable keybased pseudorandom generators ͑e.g., SHA-based͒ and preprocessing techniques may be used provided they serve the same preprocessing purpose. Because the focus of this work is to introduce the removable visible watermarking, we will not discuss other options of watermark preprocessing further.
Determination of Scaling Factor ␣ m and
Embedding Factor ␤ m The scaling and embedding factors, ␣ m and ␤ m , of Eq. ͑1͒ are used to determine the weights of the host image and watermark pattern. That is, they determine the visibility of the watermark pattern and robustness in the marked image. Unlike many existing approaches in which only the host image is considered as the side information/parameter when determining the two factors, the proposed algorithm takes the texture features of both the host image I h and original watermark I w into account in order to better conform to HVS characteristics. There are two aspects of the HVS to take into account when formulating scaling factor ␣ m :
1. First, the HVS is more sensitive to changes in midluminance areas Ref. 16 . That is, to maintain the quality of the marked image, assigning greater value of the scaling factor ␣ m for the midluminance areas is desirable. However, we also want the watermark pattern to be visible enough but not too intrusive. There-fore, the optimal choice would be assigning a greater scaling factor ␣ m in the midluminance areas and attenuating its value at darker and brighter components. Intuitively, the histogram of the scaling factor ␣ m is roughly parabola shaped. 2. Second, because the HVS is less sensitive to changes made in highly textured regions, 16 it is therefore helpful to use lower value for the scaling factor in textured regions.
The steps for determining the scaling and embedding factors, ␣ m and ␤ m , are as follows:
Step 
Mean value 1 and variance value 1 2 of the dc coefficients of the host image I h are defined, respectively, as
By the same token, the mean value 2 and variance value 2 2 of the preprocessed watermark image I pw can be obtained.
This step reflects the first aspect of the HVS we mentioned earlier because we only take the dc components, which convey the luminance of the corresponding blocks, of the images into account.
Step 3: To take the second aspect of the HVS into account in order to improve the performance, the scaling factor, ␣ m , is corrected by involving ac coefficients, which mainly reflect the texture features of the image. More energy should be received from the preprocessed watermark image I pw , where the host image I h is strongly textured because HVS is less sensitive to such regions. Likewise, more information from the highly textured areas of the preprocessed watermark image I pw should be embedded to put up resistance to unauthorized removal and to enhance the visibility of watermark I pw in watermarked image I c . It has been observed that in strongly textured block, energy tends to be more evenly distributed among the ac coefficients; thus, the variance of the ac coefficients tends to be smaller. 4 According to the above analysis of the HVS characteristics, we therefore consider that the scaling factor, ␣ m , which is used to determine the weight of the host image I h in the marked image I c , is in proportion to the m'th block variances of the ac coefficients of both the host image I h and the preprocessed watermark image I pw . To describe the direct proportional relationship, we adopt the simple additive rule in this paper, i.e., we assume that the scaling factor ␣ m is in direct proportion to variance m , where m = m h + m pw . The two parameters m h and m pw are the variances of the insignificant ac coefficients of the host image I h and the preprocessed watermark image I pw , respectively. A coefficient is deemed as insignificant if its quantized value is equal to 0. After the amendment, Eq. ͑5͒ can be rewritten as 
. ͑10͒
By the same token, we can obtain the variance m pw for the preprocessed watermark image block I m pw .
Step 4: Let ␤ m =1−␣ m and scale ␣ m and ␤ m to the ranges ͓yЈ , y * ͔ and ͓zЈ , z * ͔ to avoid obtrusive embedding, where yЈ, y * , zЈ, and z * are predetermined empirical constants.
Visible Watermark Embedding and Removal 3.1 Visible Watermark Embedding
The flowchart of the complete watermarking scheme is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Given the availability of the preprocessed watermark I pw , scaling factor ␣ m , and embedding factor ␤ m , the steps for embedding the preprocessed watermark into the host image I h are as follows: The reason for embedding only the significant coefficients is to make the other ͑i.e., insignificant͒ DCT coefficients of the hose image I h approximately unchanged in the watermarked image I c ; thus, when estimating the scaling factor ␣ m and the embedding factor ␤ m ͑see Sec. 3.2͒, the variance m h of the host image I h can be calculated according to these approximate DCT coefficients directly taken from the watermarked image I c without referring to host image I h . Because these significant ones hold most of the energy and information of the preprocessed watermark image I pw , the experimental results prove that these data are sufficient to reveal the details of the visible watermark image I w in the marked image I c . It is due to the importance of the dc coefficients of the host image I h to reconstruct the two factors ␣ m and ␤ m for removing the embedded watermark that we hide ␤ m ϫ ͓I m h ͑0,0͒ − I m pw ͑0,0͔͒ / 10.0 instead of original dc coefficient I m h ͑0,0͒ of the host image to avoid degrading the quality of watermarked image I c and to retrieve the original dc coefficients of the host image I h from the ͑S m − S m r ͒'th coefficient of the watermarked image I c .
Visible watermark removal
The procedure of removing the embedded watermark is the inverse operation of the embedding process. In order to recover the host image, scaling and embedding factors ␣ m and ␤ m must be estimated. Experimental results show that the estimated version of ␣ m and ␤ m is accurate enough to remove the watermark without inflicting noticeable distortion on the recovered image. Given the availability of the original watermark image I w , private key k, and the watermarked image I c , the steps for estimating ␣ m and ␤ m are as follows:
Step 1: Produce the preprocessed watermark I pw according to the original watermark image I w and the private key k, and then divide the preprocessed watermark I pw and the Fig. 3 Illustrations of preprocessed watermarks and watermarked images. The preprocessed watermarks shown in ͑b͒ and ͑c͒ are produced from the original watermark ͑a͒ with two similar keys 0.675634 and 0.675633. Watermarked image ͑d͒ and ͑e͒ are generated by embedding ͑b͒ and ͑c͒, respectively. The enhanced difference image of the two watermarked images is shown in ͑f͒.
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watermarked image I c into nonoverlapping 8 ϫ 8-pixel blocks, and transform these blocks into the DCT domain.
Step 2 Step 
Experimental Results
The proposed algorithm has been implemented and tested on a number of images of 256ϫ 256 pixels ͑obtained in part from Ref. 18͒ and different watermark patterns of 256ϫ 256 pixels for evaluating its performance. These images are of different texture characteristics. In the experiments, the parameter of the chaotic map, u = 3.698789 ͓see ͑2͔͒ is arbitrarily chosen from the range ͑3.5699456, 4͔ to ensure that the logistic map is in a chaotic state, pЈ = 0.41 ͑see Step 2.2 of Sec. 2.1͒ is to avoid the loss of the pattern of the original watermark I w , and yЈ = 0.78, y * = 0.87, zЈ = 0.15, z * = 0.20 ͑see Step 4 of Sec. 2͒ are empirical values, determined by lots of experiments, to strike a balance between the visual quality of the host image I h and the visibility of the embedded visible watermark I w .
Diversity of the Preprocessed Watermark Image and the Watermarked Image
When the chaotic logistic map receives different keys as its input, different chaotic matrixes D m 's will be generated to preprocess the original watermark image I w , thus the preprocessed watermark versions I pw 's are different. Moreover, a variety of watermarked image versions I c 's will be yielded after embedding these preprocessed watermarks into the host image I h . Figure 3 shows the experimental results carried out on host image lena and watermark image Fig. 3͑a͒. From Fig.  3 , we know that the two different watermark versions ͓Figs. 3͑b͒ and 3͑c͔͒ are produced under the control of two slightly different keys and that the two watermarked images ͓Figs. 3͑d͒ and 3͑e͔͒ are perceptually equivalent. However, their difference image of the two watermarked images as shown in Fig. 3͑f͒ points out that they differ from each other significantly, with the watermark pattern clearly visible. This again manifests that the two images carry distinct watermark versions.
Comparison of Legal and Illegal Watermark
Removal In the paper, given the availability of the algorithm, watermarked image, and the original watermark, if the embedded visible watermark is removed by using the correct key, then we call such removal "legal removal" instead of "illegal removal." Such a definition is compatible with the concept of Ref. 7 .
The removal of the embedded visible watermark for high-quality restoration of the original host image I h depends on the secret key rather than the unavailability of the algorithm. It is theoretically infeasible for unauthorized users to exactly predict the 16ϫ 16-element chaotic matrix D m since the secret key k is taken from an infinite space. Therefore, an unauthorized user without the correct secret key cannot obtain the recovered image with satisfactory quality because it is unrealistic, if not impossible, to estimate which watermark version I pw is embedded into the watermarked image I c . On the other hand, an authorized user, holding the correct secret key, could obtain a highquality recovered version because he/she knows which preprocessed watermark version should be subtracted from the watermarked image. For instance, Fig. 4͑a͒ indicates that we succeeded in removing the embedded watermark by using the correct secret key. However, as demonstrated in Fig.  4͑b͒ obtained by using incorrect user key, much energy residue of the watermark still exists in the illegally recovered image. The reason is that different private keys correspond to different preprocessed watermark versions for embedding so that the watermarked images differ from each other. In addition, more experimental results by using correct and incorrect keys to remove the embedded watermark are summarized in Table 1 . Just as expected, legally reconstructed images have excellent visual quality and the PSNR values of these images are over 50 dB, which are far greater than those of illegally recovered ones ͑Ͻ30 dB͒. This is because the embedded watermark version depends on the private key so that an unauthorized user has no idea about which watermark version should be subtracted from the watermarked image. Thus, the watermark preprocessing technique for the generation of the various preprocessed watermark image versions to modulate the original watermark with the user key can successfully prevent illegal removal.
Moreover, we compare the performance of the proposed algorithm with that of the Hu et al. algorithm 7 and the results are also listed in Table 1 . From Table 1 , we know that the PSNR values of the images ͑Ͼ50 dB͒ legally recovered with the proposed algorithm, using the correct secret keys, are always higher than those of the Hu et al. algorithm ͑ϳ44 dB͒. On the other hand, the PSNR values of the images ͑ϳ26 dB͒ illegally reconstructed with the proposed algorithm, using the incorrect private keys, are always lower than those of Hu et al. ͑ϳ37 dB͒. This is clear evidence that our algorithm is superior to Hu et al.
Attack Experiments
In addition to the above illegal recovery scheme ͑which removes the embedded visible watermark via trying different keys͒, an adversary may recover the original image through conducting other attack schemes, such as using image processing software, collusion attack, etc. We, therefore, briefly discuss the performance of the proposed watermarking method to be against some vital attacks in this section.
Image processing software attack
With this type of attack, there are two possible attack categories: manual and automatic. The former is using some proper pixel values to replace the watermarked pixels of the covered image. However, this method is quite difficult and time consuming to completely eliminate the embedded watermark so as to obtain a reconstructed version of the host image with satisfactory visual quality, especially for a marked image with a strongly textured watermark embedded.
The latter attack scheme is employing the integrated image-processing operations in the image-processing tools, such as median filtering, image smoothing, and image sharpening, to roughly recover the original host image. Just as expected, many experiments demonstrate that these common processing operations cannot completely remove the embedded visible watermark as well. Figure 5 shows some results obtained by testing the above three operations.
Collusion attack
Another attack scheme is the collusion attack, which recovers the original host image through combining its different watermarked versions. Thus, an attacker may remove the embedded visible watermark by averaging these different copies. We, therefore, have tested such collusion attacks on a number of images and, from the experimental results, observed that the visible watermark can be clearly seen from the final image that is resulted from averaging. This implies that the watermark component is still in the final image even if these different marked images have experienced averaging. Thus, this malicious attack scheme still fails to remove the embedded watermark. For visualization, we show an illustration of the related experimental results in Fig. 6 . The clearly visible watermarks in Figs. 6͑a͒-6͑c͒ confirm the conclusion mentioned above.
Robustness Against Compression
Generally, images transmitted on computer networks are in compressed formats. Therefore, the degree of tolerance to compression can also be deemed as an indicator for evaluating the algorithms' performance. To verify the robustness of the proposed algorithm to the compression schemes, both ordinary JPEG compression and new JPEG compression ͑i.e., JPEG2000͒ have been carried out. Figure 7 illustrates the experimental results conducted on Fig. 8 , which again suggests that the proposed watermarking system is indeed robust against ordinary JPEG compression to a certain extent.
Ordinary JPEG compression
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JPEG2000 compression
In addition to the ordinary JPEG compression, we also perform a new compression scheme ͑i.e., JPEG2000͒ to verify the robustness of the introduced algorithm. Figure 9 shows the experimental results tested on the host image Lena. From its compressed versions Figs. 9͑a͒, 9͑d͒, and 9͑g͒, it is easy to see the embedded visible watermarks can survive JPEG2000 compression attack. Furthermore, the good visual qualities of the images in the second and third columns of Fig. 9 with the watermarks legally removed demonstrate that the proposed scheme succeeds in resisting JPEG2000 compression. In addition, we apply the JPEG2000 compression to the other four typical images with visible watermarks embedded, using different compression ratios. Then, the embedded visible watermarks are legally removed from these compressed images, thus yielding the nonwatermarked images. The experimental results for measuring the qualities of these nonwatermarked images are illustrated in Fig. 10 . From Fig. 10 , we can see the PSNR values of these legally recovered images are Ͼ36, which again demonstrates that the presented watermarking technique successfully resists JPEG2000 compression.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a DCT domain-based removable visible watermarking algorithm that succeeds in defeating illegal removal and resisting compression to a certain extent. The aims of our solution are to embed the visible watermark to protect the multimedia content and to ensure that the reconstructed images are of high quality for authorized users, and otherwise, of low quality for unauthorized users. Unlike many previous approaches that directly embed watermarks into host images, the proposed scheme preprocesses the watermark using a secret key before embedding it into host images, thus preventing the embedded visible watermark from being illegally removed by unauthorized users without the correct user keys. Adaptive scaling and embedding factors are determined by establishing a mathematical model that makes use of the HVS features. Experimental results have demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed scheme. Moreover, the mechanism can be easily extended and applied to other transform domains. Lossless recovery may be implemented by using integer transform to avoid rounding error. Another future work of ours is to investigate the feasibility of inserting dual ͑i.e., invisible and visible͒ watermarks so that the watermarkremoving process can be carried out in an oblivious manner without requiring the availability of the original watermark. 
